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The “Second Demographic Transition”: 
A Conceptual Map for the Understanding of 
Late Modern Demographic Developments in 
Fertility and Family Formation 
Ron Lesthaeghe  
Abstract: »Der “zweite demographische Übergang”: Ein Orientierungskon-
zept zum Verständnis spätmoderner demographischer Entwicklungen von Fer-
tilität und Familienbildung«. This article presents a narrative of the unfolding 
of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) since the theory was first formu-
lated in 1986. The first part recapitulates the foundations of the theory, and 
documents the spread of the SDT to the point that it now covers most European 
populations. Also for Europe, it focuses on the relationship between the SDT 
and the growing heterogeneity in period fertility levels. It is shown that the cur-
rent positive relationship between SDT and TFR levels is not a violation of the 
SDT theory, but the outcome of a “split correlation” with different sub-
narratives concerning the onset of fertility postponement and the degree of 
subsequent recuperation in two parts of Europe. The second part of the article 
addresses the issue of whether the SDT has spread or is currently spreading in 
industrialized Asian countries. Evidence gathered for Japan, South Korea, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan is presented. That evidence pertains to 
both the macro-level (national trends in postponement of marriage and parent-
hood, rise of cohabitation) and the micro-level (connections between individual 
values orientations and postponement of parenthood). Strong similarities are 
found with SDT patterns in Southern Europe, except for the fact that parent-
hood is still very rare among Asian cohabiting partners. 
Keywords: demographic transition, demographic change, trends of family for-
mation, fertility trends, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, values orientations, fer-
tility postponement and recuperation, Europe and Far East. 
1. Introduction 
The first demographic transition (FDT) refers to the original declines in fertility 
and mortality, as witnessed in western countries already from the 18th and 19th 
Centuries onward, and during the second half of the 20th Century in the rest of 
the world. At present, there are barely a dozen countries left without a begin-
ning of a fertility decline brought by the manifest use of contraception. In the 
West, the control of fertility within wedlock occurred in tandem with a reduc-
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tion in final celibacy and a lowering of ages at marriage, signaling a major 
departure from its old Malthusian marriage restrictions. In the rest of the world, 
early marriage for women – often the result of arrangements between families 
or lineages – gave way to much later marriage, partly because of more individ-
ual partner choice and partly as a response to economic factors. But on the 
whole, William Goode’s prediction of 1963 forecasting a rise in non-western 
ages at marriage, has largely been borne out by the record of the last 40 years. 
This increase in ages at marriage has furthermore been a major component in 
the overall fertility decline in many such countries. 
But even before the FDT started spreading from the West and Japan to the 
LDCs, western populations were initiating a move that would take them way 
beyond what postwar “demographic transition theory” had forecasted.1 The 
fertility decline did not stop in the close vicinity of two children on average, 
and western marriage would not remain early or attract the vast majority of 
men and women. The end product does not seem to be a balanced stationary 
population with zero population growth and little or no need for immigrants. 
The “second demographic transition” (SDT) brings sustained sub-replacement 
fertility, a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, the disconnec-
tion between marriage and procreation, and no stationary population. Instead, 
western populations face declining sizes, and if it were not for immigration, 
that decline would have started already in many European countries. In addi-
tion, extra gains in longevity at older ages in tandem with sustained sub-
replacement fertility will produce a major additional ageing effect as well. This 
ageing cannot be fully compensated by “replacement migration”. But the latter 
will foster further expansions of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies.  
The first signs of the SDT emerge already in the 1950s: divorce rates were 
rising, especially in the US and Scandinavia, and the departure from a life-long 
commitment was justified by the logic that a “good divorce is better than a bad 
marriage”. Later on and from the second half of the 1960s onward, also fertility 
started falling from its overall “baby boom” high. Moreover, the trend with 
respect to ages at first marriage was reversed again, and proportions single 
started rising. Soon thereafter it became evident that premarital cohabitation 
was on the rise and that divorce and widowhood were followed less by remar-
riage and more by post-marital cohabitation. By the 1980s even procreation 
within cohabiting unions had spread from Scandinavia to the rest of Western 
Europe. Both France and the UK now have more than 40 percent of all births 
occurring out of wedlock. In 1960 both had 6 percent.  
                                                             
1  It should be noted that most authors writing during the interbellum envisaged declining 
populations as an endpoint of the FDT, and not a demographic equilibrium. The notion of a 
stationary population as a final reference point is essentially a postwar re-interpretation of 
the FDT. 
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The notion of a “Second demographic transition” (further referred to as the 
SDT), was introduced in 1986 by Dirk van de Kaa and myself in a short article 
in the Dutch sociology journal “Mens en Maatschappij”. In the wake of subse-
quent empirical evidence, the concept of a SDT has also been used by others 
(e.g. Zakharov and Ivanova, 1996; Matsuo, 2001; Raley, 2001; Sobotka et al., 
2002; Bernhardt, 2004; McLanahan, 2004; Hoem et al., 2009) as a possible 
“roadmap” for the understanding of these late modern demographic develop-
ments in the fields of fertility and family formation.2 
2. The “roots” of the SDT 
The idea of a distinct SDT stems directly from Philippe Ariès’s analysis of the 
history of childhood (1962) and from his 1980 Bad Homburg paper on the two 
successive and distinct motivations for parenthood. During the first demo-
graphic transition or FDT, the decline in fertility was “unleashed by an enor-
mous sentimental and financial investment in the child” (i.e., the “king child 
era” to use Ariès’s term), whereas the motivation during the SDT is adult self-
realization within the role or life style as a parent or more complete and ful-
filled adult. This major shift is also propped up by the innovation of hormonal 
and other forms of highly efficient contraception. During the FDT the issue 
was to adopt contraception in order to avoid pregnancies; during the SDT the 
basic decision is to stop contraception in order to start a pregnancy.  
The other “root” of the SDT-theory was the reaction of van de Kaa and my-
self toward the cyclical fertility theory, as formulated by Richard Easterlin 
(1973). In this theory, small cohorts would have better employment opportuni-
ties and hence earlier marriage and higher fertility, whereas large cohorts 
would have the opposite life chances and inversed demographic responses. The 
theory accounts very nicely for the marriage and baby boom of the 1960s, and 
also for the subsequent “baby bust” of the 1970s. But the theory equally pre-
dicts further cycles produced by the earlier ones, and hence expects a return of 
fertility to above replacement levels when smaller cohorts reach the reproduc-
tive span. By the middle of the 1980s we had become convinced that sub-
replacement fertility was not only going to last much longer, but could even 
become an “intrinsic” feature of a new demographic regime. Exits the model of 
                                                             
2  So far the SDT-theory has not been extended to the study of mortality. But also here it 
could be argued that differences in life-styles, in addition to older social class differences, 
have become major determinants of health and mortality differentials. A whole research 
area can be opened up by the question to what extent healthier forms of behavior could be 
related or not to the emergence of other values. Maybe the European Values Surveys should 
incorporate a few questions on smoking and drinking behavior. At present we only know 
that control over life and death (abortion, suicide, euthanasia) are strongly positively corre-
lated with other dimensions of individual autonomy and expressive values orientations. 
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an ultimate stationary population with a long-term population equilibrium, and 
exits the improved version of it with cyclical fertility swings around replace-
ment fertility.  
Table 1: Overview of demographic and societal characteristics respectively 
related to the FDT and SDT in Western Europe 
FDT SDT 
A. Marriage  
Rise in proportions marrying, declining 
age at first marriage 
Fall in proportions married, rise in age at 
first marriage 
Low or reduced cohabitation Rise in cohabitation (pre- & post-marital)  
Low divorce Rise in divorce, earlier divorce 
High remarriage 
Decline of remarriage following both 
divorce and widowhood 
B. Fertility  
Decline in marital fertility via reductions 
at older ages, lowering mean ages at first 
parenthood 
Further decline in fertility via postpone-
ment, increasing mean age at first parent-
hood, structural subreplacement fertility 
Deficient contraception, parity failures 
Efficient contraception (exceptions in 
specific social groups) 
Declining illegitimate fertility, but not 
necessarily among teenage women 
Rising extra-marital fertility due to parent-
hood within cohabitation and not due to 
unplanned teenage fertility 
Low definitive childlessness among mar-
ried couples 
Rising definitive childlessness in unions 
C. Societal background  
Preoccupations with basic material needs: 
income, work conditions, housing, health, 
schooling, social security. Solidarity prime 
value 
Rise of “higher order” needs: individual 
autonomy, self-actualisation, expressive 
work and socialisation values, grass-roots 
democracy, recognition. Tolerance prime 
value 
Rising memberships of political, civic and 
community oriented networks. Strengthen-
ing of social cohesion 
Disengagement from civic and community 
oriented networks, social capital shifts to 
expressive and affective types. Weakening 
of social cohesion 
Strong normative regulation by State and 
Churches. Initial secularization waves, po-
litical and social “pillarization” 
Retreat of the State, postwar secularization 
waves, sexual revolution, refusal of author-
ity, political “depillarization” 
Segregated gender roles, familistic poli-
cies, “embourgeoisement”, promotion of 
breadwinner family model 
Rising symmetry in gender roles, female 
economic autonomy 
Ordered life course transitions, prudent 
marriage and dominance of one single 
family model 
Flexible life course organization, multiple 
lifestyles, open future 
 
But there was more behind the idea of the SDT than just these two considera-
tions. Further in the background was the concept of a Maslowian preference 
drift. Stated succinctly, A. Maslow (and others before him) noticed that greater 
economic development produced a shift in concerns about material needs (sub-
sistence, shelter, physical and economic security) to non-material needs 
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Maslow (1954). These non-material needs refer to, inter alia, individual auton-
omy, freedom of thought and of expression, emancipation, self-realization and 
a strife for recognition. With such a shift in needs, also a shift in the values 
structure occurs, with tolerance for diversity and respect for individual choices 
gradually taking over as prime values from solidarity and social group adher-
ence and cohesion. With this background in mind, the FDT is considered as 
anchored mainly in the phase of the realization of the basic material needs, 
whereas the SDT is the expression of the development of the higher order, non-
material needs and of expressive values. 
Also note that the explicit inclusion of the Maslowian drift sets the SDT-
theory apart from both the neo-classic economic interpretation and any neo-
Marxist or purely structural sociology and history. The latter see demographic 
change merely as a response to changes in material circumstance and either fail 
to incorporate cultural shifts altogether or fail to specify universal mechanisms 
that link material and non-material driving forces. The addition of the 
Maslowian drift to these older paradigmata is one of the major points of orien-
tation on the SDT roadmap. At this juncture one will also notice the close re-
semblance of the SDT-theory to the “Culture Shift” theory developed by Ron 
Inglehart in the field of political science (e.g. Inglehart 1970; 1997). 
Having pointed out the intellectual origins of the SDT, we shall now turn to 
a more systematic treatment of the contrasts between the FDT and the SDT. 
Table 1 gives a summary of the points to be discussed. 
2.1 Opposite Nuptiality Regimes 
As already indicated, a first major contrast between the FDT and SDT is the 
opposite trend in nuptiality. In Western Europe the Malthusian late marriage 
pattern weakens, mainly as the result of the growth of wage earning labor, and 
this basic trend toward earlier and more universal marriage continues all the 
way till the middle of the 1960s. Hence, the lowest mean ages at first marriage 
since the Renaissance were reached in the middle of the 20th Century. Fur-
thermore, the pockets in Western Europe where cohabitation and out of wed-
lock fertility had remained high during the 19th Century were under siege 
during the first half of the 20th Century. Such behavior was not in line with 
both the religious and the secular views on what constituted a proper family. 
Extra-marital fertility rates all decline in Europe after 1900. 
By contrast, after 1965, ages at marriage rose again and cohort proportions 
ever-married started declining (Council of Europe 2004). This resulted not only 
from the insertion of an interim period of premarital cohabitation, but also from 
later home leaving and more and longer single living. The very rapid prolonga-
tion of education for both sexes since the 1950s and the ensuing change in 
educational composition of Western populations contributed to this process. 
But the unfolding of the nuptiality features of the SDT did not solely stop at a 
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rise in ages at marriage and at a mere insertion of an interim “student” period. 
Post-marital cohabitation too was on the rise3, and so was procreation by co-
habiting couples. And in many instances the latter trend is to some extent a 
“revenge of history”: cohabitation and procreation by non-married couples is 
now often highest where the custom prevailed longest during the 19th and early 
20th Centuries.  
The next contrast between FDT and SDT pertains to divorce and remarriage. 
The FDT is preoccupied with strengthening marriage and the family, and di-
vorce legislation remains strict. The State offers little opposition to religious 
doctrine in this respect. Divorce on the basis of mutual consent is rare, but 
mostly based on proven adultery. The SDT witnesses the end of a long period 
of low divorce rates and the principle of a unique, life-long legal partnership is 
questioned. This takes the form of a rational “utility” evaluation of a marriage 
in terms of the welfare of each of the adult partners first and children second. 
This is accompanied by attacking the hypocrisy of the earlier restrictive divorce 
legislation that fostered concubinage instead. The outcome in Western Europe, 
US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand was a succession of legal liberaliza-
tions in the wake of a singularly rising demographic trend. And, as pointed out 
in the introduction, the onset of the rise in divorce was probably the very first 
manifestation of the accentuation of individual autonomy in opposing the moral 
order prescribed by Church and State. It should be noted, however, that resis-
tance to divorce was stronger in countries or regions with a Catholic back-
ground than in those with a Protestant one. This is not so surprising since di-
vorce versus the indissolubility of marriage was one of the key issues that led 
to the Reformation in the first place. 
And last, but not least, FDT and SDT have also opposite patterns of remar-
riage. During the former, remarriages were essentially involving widows and 
widowers, whereas remarriage for divorced persons meant a new beginning 
and the start of a new family: “new children for a new life-long commitment”. 
In other words, even if divorce occurred, the institution of marriage was not 
under serious threat, and remarriage propped up fertility as well. Nothing of 
this is left in the SDT: remarriages among widowed or divorced persons de-
cline in favor of cohabitation or other looser arrangements such as LAT-
relationships or close and intimate friendships. This may not only have tax 
advantages or protect the inheritance rights of ones own children, but it essen-
tially leaves all further options open and safeguards individual autonomy re-
garding subsequent choices. In other words, also these arrangements are mani-
                                                             
3  A crucial distinction needs to be made between the unplanned non-marital fertility occur-
ring to single young women, often leading to lone mother households, and the often 
planned non-marital fertility of older cohabiting couples. The first type is an indicator of an 
incomplete FDT and is caused by deficient contraceptive knowledge and practice. Only the 
second type is indicative of the SDT. See also Table 1. 
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festations of the new individual desire to keep an “open future” with a minimal 
loss in social capital. 
2.2 Fertility Contrasts 
During the FDT contraception mostly affects fertility at older ages and higher 
marriage durations, mean ages at first parenthood decline, and among married 
couples childlessness is low. There are examples of below-replacement fertility 
during the FDT, but these correspond to exceptional periods of deep economic 
crises or war only4 sub-replacement fertility is not an intrinsic characteristic of 
the FDT. Under better conditions, as for instance after World War II, fertility 
levels are well above replacement level, and this not only holds for period 
indicators but also for cohort levels. The “baby boom” and the “marriage” 
boom of the late 50s and early 60s are the last typical features of the FDT 
(whereas rising divorce in that period signals the start of the SDT). Another 
salient characteristic of the FDT fertility regime was its reliance on imperfect 
contraception. Until the 1960s, coitus interruptus was largely the method used 
by the working classes and rhythm by the higher educated or more religious 
couples. Both methods led to contraceptive failures and unintended pregnan-
cies, and these also kept aggregate fertility above the two children average. 
Particularly such parity failures at higher ages became increasingly undesirable 
and fuelled the demand for more efficient contraception. 
The SDT starts with a multifaceted revolution, and all aspects of it impact 
on fertility. Firstly, there was a contraceptive revolution with the invention of 
the pill and the re-invention of IUDs. All of these were perfected very rapidly, 
and particularly hormonal contraception was suited for postponing and spacing 
purposes. After an interim period with increased incidence of “shotgun mar-
riages” (often 1965-75), the use of highly efficient and reliable contraception 
starts at young ages and permits postponement of child-bearing as a goal in its 
                                                             
4  The fact that several European countries exhibited sub-replacement fertility during the 
1930s has been interpreted (e.g. van Bavel 2010) as a form of “dress rehearsal” for the 
SDT. That is a major exaggeration, to say the least. Firstly, sub-replacement fertility in the 
1930s was also the result of much lower probabilities of surviving to the mean age of ma-
ternity (i.e. around 0.80 to 0.85). Today this is no longer the case since this probability is of 
the order of 0.98 or 0.99. Secondly, TFRs below 2 children did not occur in many Western 
or Northern European countries, and if it did, it was only for a limited time never exceeding 
a decade. Thirdly, virtually all countries had TFRs again in excess of 2 children at the end 
of the 1930s. Fourthly, the low TFRs were the result of crisis-induced tempo shifts (post-
ponement) in both marriages and first births. Marriage postponement at that time had noth-
ing to do with the rise of alternative living arrangements (independent single living, unmar-
ried cohabitation). And finally, demographers writing at that time never looked at cohort 
fertility and, as has been so often the case, typically misinterpreted a tempo shift as a quan-
tum effect. Moreover many of them had a nationalistic, moral or eugenic axe to grind, and 
interpreted period measures of replacement (e.g. Kuczynski’s Net Reproduction Rate) 
within such a context of national and racial decay. 
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own right. Secondly, there was also a sexual revolution, and it was a forceful 
reaction to the notions that sex is confined to marriage and mainly for procrea-
tion only. The younger generations sought the value of sex for its own sake and 
accused the generation of their parents of hypocrisy. Ages at first sexual inter-
course decline during the SDT. Thirdly, there was the gender revolution. 
Women were no longer going to be subservient to men and husbands, but seize 
the right to regulate fertility themselves. They did no longer undergo the “fa-
talities of nature”, and this pressing wish for “biological autonomy” was articu-
lated by subsequent quests for the liberalization of induced abortion. Finally, 
these “three revolutions” fit within the framework of an overall rejection of 
authority and of a complete overhaul of the normative structure. Parents, edu-
cators, churches, army and much of the entire state apparatus end up in the 
dock. This entire ideational reorientation, if not revolution, occurs during the 
peak years of economic growth, and shapes all aspects of the SDT. 
The overall outcome with respect to the SDT fertility pattern is its marked 
degree of postponement. Mean ages at first parenthood for women in sexual 
unions rise quite rapidly and to unprecedented levels in several Western Euro-
pean populations. The net outcome is sub-replacement fertility: without the 
ethnic component (such as Hispanics and Blacks in the US or Maoris in New 
Zealand) all OECD countries have sub-replacement fertility. Admittedly, pe-
riod measures such as the TFR are extra depressed as a result of continued 
postponing, but even the end of such postponement is not likely to bring period 
fertility back to 2.05 children. Most cohorts of the world’s white (+ Japanese) 
national populations born after 1960 will not make it to that level (cf. Frejka 
and Calot, 2001; Lesthaeghe 2001; Council of Europe 2004). However, the 
degree of heterogeneity is substantial and by no means solely the outcome of 
ethnic composition factors. In the West, Scandinavian, British and French 
cohorts born in 1960 still come close to replacement fertility, whereas these 
cohort levels fall below 1.70 in Austria, the whole of Germany and Italy. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, the cohort of 1960 will still get to two children on 
average, but not in the Russian Federation, Slovenia and the three Baltic coun-
tries (Council of Europe 2004). Moreover, in Western and Southern European 
countries with current total period fertility rates below 1.5, the catching up of 
fertility at the later childbearing ages, i.e. after age 30, has simply remained too 
weak to offset the postponement effect. The result of sustained sub-
replacement fertility is that another, but originally unanticipated trait of the 
SDT may be in the making: continued reliance on international migration to 
partially offset the population decline that would otherwise emerge within a 
few years.  
Evidently, we are very far from the ideal FDT outcome of a new stationary 
population corresponding to high life expectancies, replacement fertility, and 
little need for immigration. And we are getting further and further removed 
from the FDT prop of that demographic model, i.e. the dominance of a single 
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form of living arrangement for couples and children (namely marriage). Fi-
nally, the linchpin of the FDT system has totally eroded: collective behavior is 
no longer kept on track by a strong normative structure based on a familistic 
ideology supported by both Church and State. Instead, the new regime is gov-
erned by the primacy of individual freedom of choice. Or as van de Kaa (2003) 
has put it, fertility is now merely a “derivative”, meaning that it is the outcome 
of a prolonged  
process of self-reflection and self-confrontation on the part of prospective par-
ents […]. Then the pair will weigh a great many issues, direct and opportunity 
costs included, but their guiding light is self-confrontation: would a concep-
tion and having a child be self-fulfilling? 
2.3 Underlying Societal Contrasts 
So far, we have mainly discussed the differences between the FDT and SDT in 
terms of their demographic contrasts. But both demographic transitions have of 
course their roots in two distinct historical periods of societal development. 
Table 1 again contains a summary. 
With the exception of the very early fertility decline in France and a few 
other smaller areas in Europe, much of the FDT is an integral part of a devel-
opment phase in which economic growth fosters material aspirations and im-
provements in material living conditions. The preoccupations of the 1860-1960 
period were mainly concerned with increasing household real income, improv-
ing working and housing conditions, raising standards of health and life expec-
tancy, improving human capital by investing in education, and providing a 
safety net for all via the gradual construction of a social security system. In 
Europe, these social goals were shared and promoted by all ideological, reli-
gious or political factions (also known as “pillars” since each of them integrates 
a political party, a cluster of labor unions, news media, and social services into 
a closely tied organizational network). And in this endeavor solidarity was a 
central concept. All pillars also had their views on the desirable evolution of 
the family. For the religious pillars (Catholic, Protestant and later on Christian-
democrat) these views were based on the holiness of matrimony in the first 
place, but their defense of a closely knit conjugal family also stemmed from 
fears that the industrial society would lead to immorality, social pathology and 
to atheism. The secular pillars (i.e. Liberal and Socialist) equally saw the fam-
ily as a first line of defense against the social ills of the 19th Century, and as 
the foundation for their building of a new social order based on humanistic 
principles. Hence, although for partially different reasons, all pillars considered 
the family as the cornerstone of society. Both material and moral uplifting 
would furthermore be served best by a gender-based division of labor within 
the family: husbands assume their responsibilities as devoted breadwinners, 
and wives become the caretakers of all quality related matters. For this to be 
realized, male incomes needed to be high enough so that women could assume 
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the role of housewives. During the interbellum, all pillars, including the Social-
ist and even some Western European Communist ones, contributed to the em-
bourgeoisement of the working class through this propagation of the breadwin-
ner – housewife model.  
In short, for all social classes there should be a single family model and it 
should be served by highly ordered life course transitions: no marriage without 
solid financial basis or prospects, and procreation strictly within wedlock. The 
Malthusian preconditions of a “prudent” marriage were readapted to the social 
aspirations of the new industrial society. 
The SDT, on the other hand, is founded on the rise of the “higher order 
needs” as is defined by Maslow (1954). Once the basic material preoccupa-
tions, and particularly that of long term financial security, are satisfied via 
welfare state provisions, more existential and expressive needs become articu-
lated. These are centered on self-actualization in formulating goals, individual 
autonomy in choosing means, and recognition for their realization. These fea-
tures emerge in a variety of domains, and this is why the SDT can be linked to 
such a wide variety of empirical indicators of ideational change.  
In the political sphere such higher order or “post-materialist” (Inglehart 
1970) needs deal, inter alia, with the quest for more direct, grassroots democ-
racy, openness of government, rejection of political patronage, decline of life-
long loyalty to political or religious pillars (= “depillarization”), and the rise of 
ecological and other quality rather than quantity oriented issues on the political 
agenda. The downturn of it all is rising distrust in politics and institutions and 
growing political anomy that can fuel right wing extremism. The state is no 
longer viewed in terms of a benign provider, but again more as an Orwellian 
“big brother”. A corollary thereof is the disengagement from civic, professional 
and community oriented networks (e.g. Putnam 2000). It is likely, however, 
that they were partially substituted by more expressive (fitness clubs, medita-
tion gatherings …) or more affective (friendships) types of social capital. Work 
values and socialization values equally display a profound shift in favor of the 
expressive traits, and above all, away from respect for authority. In the former 
sphere, one is no longer satisfied with good material conditions (pay, job secu-
rity, vacations), but more and more expressive traits are being valued (e.g. 
interesting work, contact with others, work that meets ones abilities, challeng-
ing and innovative work, variation in tasks, flexible time use, etc.). Obviously 
this “anti-Fordist” orientation is initially the result of rising education and the 
growth of white-collar employment (e.g. Kohn, 1977), but it has now spread to 
all social classes and types of employment. A strong parallel can be found in 
the domain of socialization as well (e.g. Alwin 1989): all elements typical of 
conformity (obedience, order and neatness, thrift and hard work, traditional 
gender roles, religious faith) and those linked to social orientations (loyalty, 
solidarity, consideration for others) have gradually given way to expressive 
traits that stress personality (being interested in how and why, capability of 
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thinking for oneself, self-presentation, independence and autonomy). Needless 
to say that the quest for more symmetrical gender relations fits within this 
overall framework of articulation of higher order needs and expressive social roles. 
So far, we have explained why it makes sense to make distinctions and to 
number the successive historical moves from one system to the next. In the 
following section we shall address the issue of the geographical diffusion of the 
SDT to other parts of Europe. 
3. Is the SDT only a Northern and 
Western European Idiosyncrasy? 
Towards the end of the 1980s, several features of the SDT seemed to stop at the 
northern slopes of Alps and Pyrenees: the incidence of cohabitation remained 
very low, and also the rise in extra-marital fertility was either absent or very 
modest. Instead, younger adults predominantly remained in or stayed attached 
to their parental homes. Also until 1990, earlier patterns of both marriage and 
fertility had been maintained in Central and Eastern Europe. Twenty years ago, 
one could still argue that the SDT would remain a “parochial” idiosyncrasy, 
limited to Western and Northern Europe. Admittedly, the SDT features had 
emerged in European populations across the oceans (Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and parts of the US), but they failed to cross two other geo-political 
divides on the old continent. 
3.1 Central and Eastern Europe 
For Central and Eastern Europe, the picture changed completely after the col-
lapse of the Communist regimes in 1989. All SDT features emerged simultane-
ously: ages at first marriage, which had remained quite young during the pre-
ceding era, started increasing, premarital cohabitation rose, and so did 
proportions extra-marital births. In tandem with later union formation there was 
also a dramatic postponement of fertility at all ages and parities, leading to a 
precipitous drop of period indicators. In Central and Eastern Europe, TFRs fell 
below 1.5 children and even below 1.3. A new term was coined: “lowest low 
fertility” (Kohler et al. 2001). Evidently, period measures can be dramatically 
depressed when such systematic postponement occurs. However, the degree to 
which there could be catching up in cohort fertility is still uncertain, and so is 
the amount of recovery in prospective period TFR-levels. But the outcome 
seems to be that fertility will stay well below replacement at any rate. In 2002, 
all former Communist countries still had TFRs below 1.35, and as low as 1.10 
(Ukraine). The sole exceptions were Albania, with a TFR probably around 2.0, 
and Macedonia together with Serbia-Montenegro with levels around 1.75. 
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Figure 1: Percent of Extramarital Births, Selected Countries, 1950-2005 
 
    Source: Council of Europe & T. Sobotka. 
 
Initially, few observers in the former Communist countries thought that this 
could be the start of a SDT. Especially the older generation of demographers 
was highly skeptical about the concept to start with, and remained convinced 
that these marked marriage and massive fertility postponements were exclu-
sively the consequence of the economic crisis. Also the UN Economic Com-
mission for Europe initially held this view (2000). And the transition to capital-
ism was indeed a very painful one: there was the end of guaranteed life-long 
employment, a reduction in activity rates for women, a steep drop in the stan-
dard of living, a decline in state support for families, a privatization of the 
housing sector, and in several countries also a highly visible rise in poverty. 
But there was also a countercurrent of younger demographers, mainly in Russia 
(Zakharov and Ivanova 1996; Zakharov 1997) and especially the Czech Repub-
lic (Zeman et al. 2001; Rabusic 2001; Sobotka 2002) who thought that not only 
the crisis was to be held responsible, but that a SDT could be in the making as 
well. Later on, this was confirmed by Hoem et al. (2009) who showed that 
premarital cohabitation had been rising slowly prior to the 1989 events. Fur-
thermore, after 1997 the economy of several of the former Communist coun-
tries was recovering and so were per capita incomes. But there was no return to 
earlier patterns of marriage, nor an end to fertility postponement. Also the 
steady rise in extra-marital fertility, which often started before 1989, continued 
and even accelerated (see Figure 1). Of 18 such countries, only 5 still had pro-
portions of extra-marital births below 20% in 2002. At the upper tail of the 
distribution, 4 had already reached Northern European levels of above 40% 
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(Council of Europe 2004). Fifteen years earlier, these countries had percentages 
between 3 and 15 only, and solely the former GDR stood out with 34% extra-
marital births in 1985. These rapid increases are admittedly also the result of 
the rise in proportions of first births in the declining total, but they undeniably 
reflect that one of the key SDT characteristics, i.e. procreation within cohabit-
ing unions, is spreading in Central and Eastern Europe as well.  
The verdict seems to be that the economic crisis had indeed destabilized the 
earlier demographic regime, but also that the SDT had been in the making 
before 1990, and that it is developing further, i.e. also during economic recov-
eries. In other words, the SDT is emerging in Central and Eastern Europe as a 
feature that is there to stay, just as in the West. Once more is it emerging as a 
salient characteristic of capitalist economies and of cultures that recognize the 
primacy of individual autonomy and that develop the higher order needs. 
3.2 Southern Europe 
As indicated earlier, also the demographic patterns of Southern Europe, from 
Portugal to Greece, have been considered as an exception to the theory of two 
successive transitions. In fact, in one crucial respect these countries were not an 
exception at all, since their marriage and fertility postponements were even 
more pronounced than in Western and Northern Europe. The postponement 
started later than in the West, but the intensity was equally striking. Moreover, 
as was also true for a few Western countries like Austria and to some degree 
also of Germany (former FRG), cohort fertility patterns in Southern Europe 
hardly exhibited signs of fertility recuperation after age 30 (Lesthaeghe 2001; 
Frejka and Calot 2001). This means that not only progression to the second or 
third child are rarer than in Northern and Western Europe, but also that in the 
younger cohorts larger proportion – typically in excess of 20% – will not make 
it to parenthood at all. All of that together is of course a recipe for prolonged 
“lowest low” fertility, and not for a temporary dip and swift return to replace-
ment level. Hence, seen from the fertility angle, Southern Europe did follow 
the overall postponement trends in nuptiality and fertility, and these countries 
are by no means exceptions to these core SDT-features. 
What made the Southern European starting pattern of the SFT so special and 
so exceptional when compared to their northern neighbors was the absence of 
home leaving in favor of independent single living or in favor of premarital 
cohabitation. Furthermore, marriage still remained the predominant precondi-
tion for procreation. In other words, a part of the SDT-package was missing. 
Cohesive explanations for this syndrome have been offered by R. Palomba 
(1995), G. Micheli (1996; 2000), and G. Dalla Zuanna (2001). The latter author 
also directly refers to D. Reher’s (1998) distinction between the historically 
“strong family system” of Southern Europe and the traditionally “weak” one of 
Western and Northern Europe.  
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In the “weak system” children can leave the parental household before mar-
riage, and then they fend for themselves in an interim period of celibacy prior 
to marriage. Historically, they became servants, apprentices, landless and/or 
seasonal laborers, industrial workers, soldiers, seamen, or clergymen. In con-
temporary Northern and Western Europe, welfare provisions still stress this 
earlier independence via sufficient student housing, scholarships, student trans-
portation subsidies, youth unemployment benefits and employment programs, 
and even guaranteed minimum incomes for single persons older than 18 and no 
longer living at home. The result is still earlier home leaving for independent 
living, sharing or cohabiting. Moreover, young adults learn to take on responsi-
bilities and coping strategies, which are all needed later on in life. Even men 
learn to stand on their own feet, also when typical household tasks are in-
volved. Greater gender symmetry also fosters higher female employment rates, 
and vice versa. The household standard of living is based on dual incomes, but 
women can take off spells of time for family reasons (e.g. maternity leave, 
optional leaves for child-rearing or caring for sick partner or parent, etc.). Ei-
ther or both partners can also opt for part-time employment, and labor market 
flexibility enhances these options. Furthermore, this system is perfectly com-
patible with the shift toward expressive values and roles, and it creates less 
tension between self-fulfillment and parenthood.  
In the “strong family” type, familial ties and solidarity – even allegiance to 
alliances of families as in Southern Italy – are more persistent throughout life. 
Men and women only leave the parental family to marry, and sons can even 
bring their wife into the parental home. Men are looked after by their mother 
and then immediately thereafter by their wife. The old gender roles persist and 
men stay away from housework. Furthermore, the family bonds continue to 
function throughout life, both between siblings (e.g. in business) and between 
generations. Older people are still taken in by their children. Mediterranean 
societies furthermore developed their welfare provisions on the assumption that 
such strong familial solidarity would continue to hold, and they have very few 
provisions that allow young adults to become economically more independent. 
On top of that, housing falls largely within the private sector, and most couples 
want to become home-owners. The resulting relative high housing costs tend to 
retard the departure. The overall outcome has been that home leaving is much 
later than in Western and Northern Europe, and that there is little cohabitation 
or fertility among unmarried couples. Instead, young adults continue to live in 
their “gilded nests” provided by caring parents. And for women, motherhood 
also means dropping out of the labor force, not only because this is to be ex-
pected from a “good mother”, but also because child care facilities are scarce 
and the returning to an earlier job more difficult. Opportunity costs are hence 
increased as a consequence of the persistence of old role patterns and less 
flexible labor markets. The ultimate outcome is what Dalla Zuanna calls “a 
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Pyrrhus victory of the strong family system”, because, quite paradoxically, it 
will disappear for lack of adaptive capacity and lack of children.  
But, does history stop here? Will the Mediterranean demographic system 
maintain this hitherto characteristic lack of alternative household types among 
younger adults? The presence of such households is not routinely flagged by 
European registration systems, and hence we have to wait for special surveys 
(or an occasional census) to monitor changes in household forms. Given that 
the European Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) of the early 1990s are out-
dated by now, and really give the history of the 1970s and 1980s at any rate, we 
are short of indicators. The major exception is that most European countries 
still make the distinction between births occurring within marriage and out of 
wedlock. From this information we cannot infer the respective shares of extra-
marital births contributed by single mothers and by cohabiting couples. But, as 
the record has shown for most continental Western and Northern European 
countries, the lion’s share has gone to the latter. Hence, extra-marital fertility 
provides an imperfect, but still very useful early indicator of SDT progression 
to one of the later phases, i.e. that of procreation within cohabitation. 
After a long spell with low levels, also non-marital fertility started a steady 
upward trend in Southern Europe. Portugal – which historically had a tradition 
of cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility (cf. Livi-Bacci 1971) in its south-
ern provinces – is the exception. This country had steadily increasing propor-
tions of extra-marital births since the 1970s. And when Portuguese figures are 
compared to those for Western European countries, then the Portuguese rise 
precedes that of the corresponding increase in the Netherlands, Belgium, Ger-
many (FRG) and Switzerland. Spain is a more classic example of a late start 
and from a lower level, but the Spanish curve now runs parallel to Portugal’s, 
and in 2002, Spain’s extra-marital births share is larger than Switzerland’s. 
Apparently, the Pyrenees and the “strong family system” were not that formi-
dable an obstacle to the diffusion of the SDT. 
There are a few more surprises in Southern Europe. Firstly, there is a very 
steep and continuing increase in out of wedlock fertility in Malta during the 
1990s as the figure jumps from 2% in 1990 to 15% in 2002. Secondly, there 
has been a steady increase in Italian extra-marital fertility as well. It started 
from very low levels in the 1960s, but the indicator is now equally reaching 
15%. Judging from this record, the strong family system in Italy may be just 
that bit stronger than in Portugal, Spain, or Malta, but it is clearly not com-
pletely impermeable to the SDT. In fact, Italy is now catching up with the most 
“conservative” case in the Western European set, i.e. Switzerland, which has 
already quite a widespread occurrence of cohabitation, but equally matched to a 
low level of extra-marital fertility limited to 10% of all births. And this is fur-
ther corroborated by results of the latest Italian census: in the 1980s unmarried 
cohabitation was restricted to the German speaking district of Alto Adige (also 
known as Southern Tirol), but in 2000 cohabitation is widespread in many 
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more northern areas, both rural (e.g. in Aosta, Emilia-Romagna) and urban 
(e.g. Rome, Milan). Thirdly, the percentage of non-marital births has also 
reached the 10% level in 2000 in the FYR of Macedonia. And finally, the last 
part of the Mediterranean “strong family belt”, i.e. Greece and Cyprus also 
have an upward acceleration of the trend, but the levels of extra-marital fertility 
are still to low to justify any firmer conclusion. But, if Central and Eastern 
Europe follow suit, and now also the Iberian countries and Malta, one can 
imagine that there is also a take-off of non-traditional household forms in Italy 
or even Macedonia. The Eastern Mediterranean then constitutes the last area to 
be affected. Compared to 10 years ago, history has moved on in the predicted 
direction in Southern Europe as well. 
3.3 Western and Northern Europe 
To end this section on the European diffusion of the SDT, we would also like 
to point out that the process is not yet complete in Western and Northern 
Europe either. As the extra-marital fertility indicator shows, the proportions of 
births out of wedlock are still increasing in most countries considered on Figure 
1, and this includes the ones with the highest incidence of all, namely Iceland, 
Sweden, Eastern Germany (former GDR), Norway and France. Apparently the 
figure of 60% of all births being born outside marriage is a possibility for these 
vanguard countries. Yet, it should also be pointed out that there is a distinctly 
more conservative version of the Western European SDT in which single liv-
ing, sharing or cohabitation have become common, but where a marriage is still 
connected to the transition to parenthood. Then, the parenthood decision often 
comes first, and the marriage decision follows. In such situations extra-marital 
fertility is also rising but more slowly and at lower levels. Good examples of 
this variant are Switzerland, Western Germany (former FRG), Belgium (mainly 
Flanders) and to some extent also the Netherlands. Ireland, by contrast now 
seems to make the jump from the latter, more conservative category to the 
former, more advanced SDT category of countries. In fact, Ireland has already 
crossed the 30% level, whereas in 1980 it barely had 5% of births out of wedlock.  
4. Historical Path Dependency and Growing Heterogeneity 
in the SDT Patterning 
So far we have documented that the SDT features did not stop at the borders of 
Northern and Western Europe and that the new pattern survived well beyond 
the 1990s crisis in former Communist Central and much of Eastern Europe as 
well. But in the meantime it has become increasingly evident that the mixture 
of SDT ingredients may vary quite widely depending on context. Substantial 
within-country and between-country contrasts can be found (e.g. Billari and 
Kohler 2004; Neels 2006; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006; Sobotka 2008; Lest-
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haeghe 2009), and the same holds between educational categories (e.g. Neels 
2006; 2009). Obviously such contextual variations reflect historical path de-
pendency, and these play just as large a role in the unfolding of the SDT as 
they did in producing leads and lags during the FDT. Hence, the SDT-theory 
should not be taken as a teleological grand script with a standard scenario. Just 
the opposite is true: it is a more general narrative that leaves room for many 
different sub-narratives, each of which to be anchored more directly to case-
specific empirical evidence. 
4.1 Dissociations between the Rise of Cohabitation and the 
Postponement of Parenthood 
Right from the very beginning of the SDT countries have exhibited striking 
differences in the timing of the onset of respectively the rise in pre-marital 
cohabitation and of the postponement of fertility. In Western Europe, for in-
stance, both were timed rather closely, but in Southern Europe there was a 
major lag of about 20 years, with cohabitation coming in much later. 
Spatial dissociations within a single country are equally present. In the USA, 
both state and county-level characteristics of household formation first split 
along two dimensions: vulnerability of young households (indicators pertaining 
to teenage fertility, young lone mothers, grandchildren in household) and an 
SDT-dimension (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). The first dimension is a typi-
cal American feature associated with low education and poverty (with milder 
versions found in the UK and Australia as well). But when the analysis of the 
American SDT-dimension was pushed a step further, two spatial sub-
dimensions appeared: the North Atlantic states were most advanced in the 
postponement of fertility in the age group 20-29 with clear sub-replacement 
fertility among non-Hispanic whites, whereas the vanguard with respect to 
cohabitation were the liberal Mountain states (Colorado, Arizona) and the 
Pacific ones. Furthermore, marriage and fertility postponement was strongly 
associated with high education levels for both sexes, whereas cohabitation was 
connected to higher proportions born abroad or out of state. However, at the 
other end of the distribution, middle and low levels of cohabitation remained 
closely correlated with earlier fertility schedules in the central childbearing 
ages and higher non-teenage fertility in the Southern states, the Appalachian 
ones, the conservative Mountain states (esp. Utah and Idaho), and the Great 
Plains states. The overall image is that of a first set of states where the SDT has 
not yet taken off, a second set where both cohabitation and fertility postpone-
ment hold the middle ground, and a leading SDT set which splits into two 
groups depending on whether they are at the vanguard of either postponement 
of parenthood or of cohabitation. 
The Belgian spatial analysis (Neels 2006; Lesthaeghe 2009) at the level of 
arrondissements produced an even clearer picture. The rise of cohabitation and 
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out of wedlock fertility after 1970 simply portrays the spatial continuity of the 
maps of the marital fertility decline and the rise of contraception during the 
FDT (1880-1940), and they are an almost perfect correlate of secularization 
levels from 1860 through 1960. The map of the fertility postponement after 
1970, by contrast, bears no resemblance to this long historical secularization 
dimension, but typically reflects higher education and higher employment 
levels of women. The latter feature is equally forcefully echoed in the micro-
level data analyzed by Neels (2006; 2009) which show that better educated 
women have been the stronger postponers ever since WW II. 
The partial dissociation between the new household forms and fertility post-
ponement in the US and the complete dissociation in the Belgian spatial pattern 
of the SDT point in the direction of different causes. In both countries cohabita-
tion spreads faster in more secularized areas and bears only a weaker relation-
ship to education levels and female labor force participation. Postponement of 
parenthood is more strongly associated to the latter structural factors. Within 
the framework of Coale’s (1973) “Ready, Willing, and Able” paradigm, the 
limiting factor for the rise in cohabitation seems to be of the “Willingness” 
type, meaning that it depends more strongly on a moral acceptability and le-
gitimacy rather than on the calculus of advantage. This is understandable since 
cohabitation initially ran counter to the prevailing moral and legal codes in 
many countries. The postponement of parenthood, by contrast, is less condi-
tioned by moral objections but more responsive to material conditions, and 
hence linked to structural factors associated with the “Readiness” condition (for 
details, see Lesthaeghe 2010). 
The strong connection between cohabitation and a set of liberal values not 
only derives support from spatial analyses such as the ones just cited, but 
equally from individual level data. That evidence will now be discussed briefly 
in the next section, but draws on numerous empirical publications (see Lest-
haeghe 2002a, for an overview and citations). 
4.2 Value Orientations and Household Choices: 
Micro Level Evidence 
The initial article on the SDT (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986) posited that 
the new living arrangements and cohabitation in particular were the expressions 
of secular and anti-authoritarian sentiments of younger cohorts with a more 
egalitarian world view, and who also put greater emphasis on the expressive 
values. Equally during the 1980s the correlates of Inglehart’s “post-materialist” 
orientation were high on the research agenda of the political scientists (Ingle-
hart 1990; van Rijsselt 1989). Both the Eurobarometer surveys in the EU and 
the three rounds of European Values Studies (EVS) provided data for more 
detailed empirical research on attitude and value profiles for various social 
groups, including those based on living arrangements (e.g. Lesthaeghe and 
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Moors 1995). Particularly the EVS data of the 1999-2000 round proved useful 
for our purposes since for the first time questions about ever experiencing 
cohabitation spells or divorce were incorporated along with the current house-
hold positions. This meant that the large group of currently married respon-
dents could be divided in those with and those without cohabitation or divorce 
experience. These refinements brought very clear distinctions in values orienta-
tions to the surface (see Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002b; 2004). 
Also in the US statistical associations between living arrangements and spe-
cific value orientations drew attention. Not only was it realized that cohorts 
were steadily progressing to higher levels of “post-materialism” and secular-
ism, but also that there was a recursive relationship between demographic 
choices and values orientation. As Thornton and colleagues in Michigan illus-
trated (1985, 1987, 1992), greater secularism fostered choices in favor of pre-
marital sex and non-traditional household formation patterns, but the latter also 
reinforced further secularization. In other words, there was a selection into 
various types of behavior based on existing values to start with, and then an 
affirmation or strengthening of these values based on the behavioral choice. 
Clearly, the statistical associations between value orientations and the various 
types of households are merely the “footprints” of this ongoing life course 
process of selection followed by affirmation or negation of values. On the basis 
of successive cross-sections the two directions of causation cannot be disentan-
gled, and clearly panel data with values measurements and transitions in 
household positions are needed. American social scientist took the lead in 
organizing panel surveys, and it is mainly on the basis of these that the recur-
sive model of selection/adaptation could be checked (e.g. Waite, Kobrin, and 
Witsberger 1986; Axinn and Thornton 1993; Barber 1998; Barber et al. 2002; 
Clarkberg 2002). More recently, also a few European panels measure various 
value orientations at successive waves, and they too now lend themselves to 
disentangling the causal components of the recursive relationship (e.g. Moors 
1997; Jansen and Kalmijn 2002). 
The outcomes of these cross-sectional and panel data can be summarized as 
follows: 
1) Secular, egalitarian, anti-authoritarian orientations, expressive values and 
values stressing individual autonomy are strong predictors of life courses 
that include “unconventional” states such as pre-marital cohabitation and pa-
renthood among cohabitors. These effects are net of structural effects linked 
to education, socio-economic status, employment situation or degree of ur-
banity.  
2) Cohabitants without children tend to exhibit the most non-conformist values 
profile of all, including greater gender symmetry, less racism, more protest 
proneness but also greater tolerance for breaches of civil morality. 
3) Marriage and parenthood are associated with major readjustments of value 
orientations in the conventional and conformist direction. 
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4) Married parents who never cohabited display by far the most conservative 
attitudes. 
5) Any earlier cohabitation experience leaves a more permanent imprint in the 
non-conformist direction, even after marriage and parenthood had been a-
chieved. 
6) And also divorce produces a move away from the stability of conventional 
opinions held by married parents.5 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that these associations at the micro level are 
found all over Europe, from Scandinavia to Iberia and from Ireland to Ukraine. 
They hold just as well in countries that have progressed very far along the SDT 
as in those that are more recent starters. 
4.3 Fertility and the SDT: Postponement and Recuperation 
The typical explanation for the fertility decline associated with the SDT is the 
postponement of parenthood, and the shifting of the entire fertility schedule to 
older ages. This idea is perfectly reflected in the Bongaarts-Feeney (1998) 
formula used to upwardly correct the current period total fertility rate (PTFR) 
for this tempo shift. In this expression, however, the authors have no room for 
differential subsequent recuperation of postponed births. They use the standard 
assumption of fixing the current period parity specific TFRs (PTFRi) and in-
flating these by the complement of the annual rate of parity specific postpone-
ment observed in the last few years. Reality is a bit more complicated than that. 
Not only is the rate of postponement variable over time, but the European ex-
perience clearly shows that a great deal of heterogeneity exists with respect to 
the amount of catching up of fertility at later ages. This is most clearly shown 
in the comparison of cohort fertility profiles, either parity specific or for all 
parities confined. Such comparisons reveal the existence of cases with very 
different catching up profiles. At one hand, there are countries where each 
cohort postpones more than its precursor, but where the ultimate offspring (i.e. 
the cohort total fertility rate or CTFR) is fairly constant, because of the recu-
peration at older ages of almost all postponed births. The Netherlands is a typi-
cal example of this outcome, but it also holds for the Scandinavian countries, 
France and Belgium. Also, PTFRs in these countries will bounce back when 
the tempo shift stops. At the other hand are cases where such recuperation is 
absent or very modest, and where CTFRs are continuously falling for as long as 
the postponement trend has not been stopped. Moreover, these CTFRs will 
remain well below replacement level and hardly bounce back due to such a 
                                                             
5  All these effects are of course net effects, i.e. established after controls for the typical 
structural background variables such as age, education, place of residence, income or SES, 
employment status. 
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lack of recuperation. Typical examples of this pattern are the Mediterranean 
countries, but also the German speaking populations of Western Europe (cf. 
Lesthaeghe 2001; Frejka and Sardon 2004; Sobotka 2004; 2008). For the for-
mer Communist countries, differential recuperation may now be surfacing too. 
They had their major postponement trend during the 1990s and couples who 
were then in their early twenties are now old enough to exhibit the presence or 
absence of such a later age correction. The bottom line here is that initial dif-
ferences in PTFRs among European populations were indeed largely due to 
differential rates of postponement, but that differential recuperation will now 
increasingly determine the PTFRs during the first two decades of the 21st Cen-
tury (Sowers and Lesthaeghe 2007). The degree to which this will occur cannot 
be inferred from a mechanistic formula, but is a matter which needs to be con-
tinuously assessed empirically and which ultimately – like so many things in 
life – will depend on varying historical and current circumstances and policy 
measures. 
At the time of the original formulation of the SDT-theory, i.e. 1986, the sys-
tematic postponement of marriages and first births was already well on its way 
in Western European countries. Both van de Kaa and myself then predicted that 
the new cultural shifts toward the expressive needs in tandem with increased 
individual autonomy would further sustain this demographic tempo shift. The 
outcome then would be “structural” sub-replacement fertility instead of cycli-
cally oscillating fertility around replacement level. At that time, we did not 
predict the coming of “lowest-low” fertility or PTFRs below 1.3 children, nor 
were we able to differentiate between strong and weak recuperation. The latter 
feature would only draw attention more than a decade later (Lesthaeghe and 
Willems 1999; Lesthaeghe 2001; Calot and Frejka 2001) and independently 
from the SDT-theory. 
However, also van de Kaa (2002) and later Sobotka (2008) showed that the 
SDT was indeed a good predictor of postponement, capable of neatly aligning 
countries along a positive slope: the higher the level of Inglehart Postmaterial-
ism (van de Kaa) or the higher the composite index of SDT-values (Sobotka), 
the higher the mean age of women at first birth or the earlier the onset of fertil-
ity postponement. To elucidate this point, we have reproduced the original 
graphs of these authors in Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the Mean Age at First Birth and the Inglehart 
Index of Postmaterialism 
 
Source: D. J. van de Kaa 2002. 
Figure 3: Relationship between a Composite Index of SDT-Values and the 
Date of Onset of the Postponement of First Births 
 
Source: T. Sobotka 2008. 
 
The plot thickens considerably when the same exercise is repeated for the 
PTFRs. The original SDT-postponement relationship vanishes, and it turns out 
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that a positive correlation emerges when total fertility is connected to the SDT 
values index6, as shown by Sobotka in Figure 4. By 2000 the high SDT-
countries had by far the higher period fertility levels in Europe, and some had 
come very close again to replacement levels7. None of them ever fell below a 
PTFR of 1.50, and by 2007, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, the 
UK, France and Ireland all had PTFRs in excess of 1.80 (Prioux 2008). The 
positive relationship with the SDT values index in Figure 4 is in fact the result 
of “split correlation” and produced by two distinct essentially neutral scatters. 
The collection of cases on the right side corresponds to countries with an early 
start in fertility postponement and a history of good recuperation of fertility 
foregone at earlier ages. The cases on the left side with much lower PTFRs are 
either cases with a slightly later postponement start combined with a weak 
recuperation schedule (German speaking populations and especially Southern 
European ones) or with a late start of postponement, and inadequate recupera-
tion so far (mainly formerly Communist countries).  
If the SDT-theory wants to be relevant for the 21st Century fertility differen-
tials in Europe, it needs to incorporate explanations for differential recuperation 
as well. And that was lacking so far. 
With the benefit of hindsight it seems that certain aspects of the SDT have 
fostered postponement of parenthood and hence tended to lower overall period 
                                                             
6  Sobotka used 1999-2000 European Values Surveys attitudinal items to catch the “SDT 
values” package. His SDT-values Index contains 8 items pertaining to gender equity, secu-
larization, sense of freedom of choice, importance of children and leisure, marriage as an 
institution, and ethics (see Sobotka 2008, 85-86). Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002; 2004) use 
a much larger set of 80 items from the same source to map the unfolding differentiations in 
life course development patterns in European countries. 
7  The most recent TFR-levels in the US, Australia and New Zealand are all very close to 
replacement level or even above it. This has been taken as evidence that these are not SDT 
countries or that the SDT theory simply does not hold. This critique obviously overlooks 
the issue of heterogeneous population composition and the presence of subpopulations 
which have not yet completed their FDT. In the US, the Hispanic TFR is still 2.99 in 2007, 
whereas that of non-Hispanic whites is 1.87 (including the high fertility of Mormons and 
Evangelicals), setting the national level at 2.12 (National Vital Statistics Report, March, 
2009). Add to that the high US teenage fertility level (and rising among Hispanics) which is 
equally indicative of an incomplete FDT. Similarly, in New Zealand the national TFR-level 
was above replacement in 2006 only thanks to the Maori contribution of a TFR of 2.78, and 
despite the low fertility of the New Zealand Asians (TFR=1.52). In Australia, the TFR rose 
rapidly from 1.76 in 2005 to 1.97 in 2008. Here the Aborigines’ contribution was negligi-
ble, but a large birth premium of AUS $ 5,000 (about US $ 4,500) has probably spurred on 
the recuperation effect after 2004. But since one can get a second child only once, the effect 
of this bonus is expected to wear off (cf. the temporary effect of the Swedish maternity 
leave prolongation measure). 
Similarly, it should be noted that most western and northern European countries benefit 
from the higher fertility of their mainly Muslim subpopulations. Such a contribution to the 
national TFRs is commonly of the order of 0.05 to 0.10 (Sobotka 2008, 56). For example, if 
a subpopulation of 10% of the total contributes a TFR of 2.80, and the remaining 90% a 
sub-replacement TFR of 1.80, then the overall TFR is 1.90.  
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fertility levels, whereas other SDT aspects have facilitated a more complete 
recuperation, thereby bringing PTFRs back to higher levels. We shall try to 
clarify these opposite effects by making use of Figure 5. 
Figure 4: Relationship between the Composite Index of SDT-Values and the 
2004 Period Total Fertility Rates 
 
Source: T. Sobotka 2008. 
Figure 5: The Double Effect of SDT-Connected Factors on Total Fertility 
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On the postponement side we should place social and economic factors associ-
ated with prolonged education and longer career building time in deregulated 
and “globalizing” labor markets. However, to these “mechanical” (e.g. pro-
longed study periods) or structural factors also cultural features can be added 
such as greater aspirations for self-realization, a greater tendency to keeping an 
open future, or higher consumption and leisure aspirations. The former are 
typical structural features of post-industrial societies, whereas the latter are 
more closely connected to the expressive values orientations. Together these 
two sets of factors have a negative effect on fertility operating via their post-
ponement effect (top part of Figure 5). 
Subsequent recuperation of fertility, on the other hand, may be considerably 
enhanced by factors that facilitate the combination of work and parenthood for 
women and men, or that alleviate the opportunity costs of parenthood and 
family building. A further distinction can be made referring to (i) historical 
household patterns and gender relations (e.g. the contrast between the “strong” 
and “weak” family types, existence of neolocal marriage or of three generation 
co-residence, etc.) and (ii) the type of organization and magnitude of welfare 
provisions (e.g. children allowances, parenthood leave, work interruptions for 
family reasons) and other organizational features (e.g. school opening hours 
and day care provisions). These structural features equally have to be seen in 
interaction with value orientations connected to self-reliance of young adults 
(and of men in particular) and to gender symmetry in daily practice (bottom 
part of Figure 5). The separate impact of each of these factors is not easy to 
assess, but when taken together substantial differences in fertility recuperation 
patterns can be created. In fact, the “split correlation” noticed in Figure 4 may 
in part be due to national contrasts in this respect. Just focusing on western and 
southern European countries, for instance, Thévenon (2009) notes striking 
differences in factors that alleviate time pressure on parents of young children. 
Not surprisingly, all those countries with higher fertility levels due to strong 
recuperation have better adapted services and much longer opening hours of 
facilities (“services de garde”) for infants and toddlers, for preschool children 
in kindergarten, and for children in primary school alike.  
To conclude, the original formulation of the SDT-theory predicted a long 
period with below-replacement fertility – and apparently correctly so – but it 
did not specify that any further, nor did the theory predict the current discrep-
ancy between levels close to replacement and levels far below it. The current 
heterogeneity witnessed in Europe is indeed due to differences in the timing of 
the onset of fertility postponement, but increasingly also the result of differ-
ences in the degree of fertility catching up at older ages. The cultural compo-
nents used in the SDT-theory appear to be operating in opposite directions: 
some foster postponement and hence lower fertility, but some others are sup-
portive of greater recuperation. The weight of context specific features, both of 
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a historical and organizational nature, is again considerable, and consequently 
SDT sub-narratives are necessary to catch that diversity.  
5. Can the SDT also Spread to Non-Western Populations? 
At present everyone has come to terms with the fact that the FDT is a world-
wide phenomenon. Furthermore, everyone equally realizes that the FDT can 
take-off at just about any level of economic development, and in strictly rural 
as well as urban societies. But, will the SDT be equally universal? Or indeed, 
as David Coleman (2004) expects, remain a regional idiosyncrasy and only a 
secondary feature? Obviously, if we wish to address this question on a global 
scale, we can only speculate about the probabilities of such a “universal” diffu-
sion, in the same way that one could only speculate in the 1950s and 1960s 
about the eventuality of pervasive fertility control emerging in the then devel-
oping countries. However, if we are looking for SDT evidence beyond the 
European cultural spheres but in countries that are wealthy enough to have 
undergone some Maslowian drift, we may indeed find suitable testing grounds. 
Several industrialized and urbanized Asian countries are therefore of direct 
relevance. 
Before considering the detailed evidence, one should be reminded of the fact 
that the SDT diagnosis requires the presence of several features: 
1) Sub-replacement fertility is not enough, but must be linked to postponement 
of parenthood. 
2) Ages at marriage must rise and reflect a growing prominence of free partner 
choice and female autonomy. 
3) Premarital cohabitation must become more common and more acceptable. 
4) Not only evidence at the macro-level must be mustered, but also at the indi-
vidual level connections between the demographic features and values ori-
entations must exist. 
 
Note, however, that the demographic characteristics of the SDT features are not 
necessarily occurring simultaneously, but that lags are likely to emerge. Pre-
marital cohabitation and parenthood among cohabitors, for instance, typically 
constitute lagging features, since they often run counter to existing moral codes 
(cf. supra RWA-model applied to US and Belgium). 
5.1 Sub-Replacement Fertility and Postponement in 
Asian Industrialized Countries 
The criterion of a shift toward later parenthood and sub-replacement fertility is 
the easiest to assess since national demographic statistics provide clear evi-
dence on the course of period and cohort fertility. As far as levels are con-
cerned, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore all have very 
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low PTFRs at present. Hong Kong’s PTFR is in the vicinity of 1 child, Singa-
pore’s is marginally higher and around 1.1, and Taiwan, South Korea and Ja-
pan are in the 1.15-1.25 range (CIA data base, 2008). In all cases these “lowest-
low” fertility levels are indeed the result of vast postponement with very little 
or no recuperation at later ages of overall fertility. Obviously, there is some 
recuperation of first births, but this is offset by further declines at higher pari-
ties. (see inter alia Xia Zhang 2005; Jones, Straughan, and Chan 2009; Tsuya 
2009; Frejka and Sardon 2009). 
To appreciate the size of the fertility postponement and the weak impact of 
recuperation in the “lowest-low” East Asian countries, use is made of the trend 
in cohort cumulated fertility up to age 27, which is illustrative of postpone-
ment, and that in cohort cumulated fertility between ages 27 and 40, illustrative 
of recuperation. All data are provided in Frejka and Sardon (2009), for 38 low 
fertility countries. The evolution of cumulated fertility up to age 27 is presented 
in Figure 6, and that for ages 27 to 40 in Figure 7. In these figures, we have 
selected three countries with early postponement but good recuperation 
(France, Netherlands, Sweden), 3 European countries with weak recuperation 
(Austria, Italy and Spain) and 4 East Asian countries (Japan, Hong Kong, 
South Korea and Taïwan). 
Figure 6: Cumulated Cohort Fertility up to Age 27 in Selected Countries 
Postponement: cumulated fertility up to age 27 by 
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        Source: Frejka and Sardon 2009, Appendix 3. 
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Figure 6 illustrates that the 4 Asian countries are just as much exhibiting the 
fertility postponement trend as the European. In fact, Hong Kong had massive 
postponement for the cohorts born between 1945 and 1965, whereas Taïwan 
and South Korea have a fast postponement tempo for the cohorts born after 
1965. Also note that the Hong Kong, Japanese and Korean cohorts born in 
1980 have less than 40 children per 100 women born before age 27. With these 
figures they match the experience of Spain and Italy. 
Figure 7 shows the trends in fertility in the age bracket 27-40, i.e. when 
catching up should occur. Not surprisingly, the clearest increase and the highest 
levels are encountered among the Northern and Western European examples 
used here, whereas Hong Kong has a continued fall in its older age fertility, and 
Japan exhibits a trend reversal from slightly catching up to loosing new ground. 
This lends support to the speculation that the Far Eastern populations are fol-
lowing a “Mediterranean pattern” with rapid postponement and little recupera-
tion at older ages, thereby sustaining a period fertility level that equally falls 
within the “lowest-low” category (for Taïwan and Hong Kong see: Tu and 
Zhang 2004). 
Figure 7: Cumulated Cohort Fertility in the Age Bracket 27 to 40, 
Selected Countries 
Recuperation: cumulated cohort fertility between ages 
27 and 40.
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5.2 The Asian Marriage Revolution 
Many populations of the Far East, and not only those of industrialized coun-
tries, have witnessed a dramatic increase in the mean ages at marriage for both 
sexes. The “marriage revolution” that W. Goode was forecasting already in the 
1960s emerged in full force between 1970 and 2000, as illustrated in Table 2 
by the percentages single women at ages 30-34 and 40-44 (Jones, 2004). In 
2000 more than a quarter of all women aged 30-34 were still single in Japan 
and Myanmar, and about a fifth were not yet married among the Chinese in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Probably more recent figures for Thai women will 
come close to a fifth as well. Also note that percentages single for men are 
typically higher than for women. For instance in Japan 2004, a third of the men 
aged 30-34 were still unmarried. The classic correlates are again larger propor-
tions of men and women with more schooling, larger proportions of them em-
ployed outside agriculture and other domestic industries, less employment 
security, but also much smaller proportions accepting arranged marriages. If, 
according to G. Jones (2004), current western European figures of proportions 
single were to be corrected for cohabitation, then several Asian populations 
would be running ahead in proportions “effectively single”.  
Table 2: Increases in Percentages of Never-Married Women in the Age Groups 
30-34 and 40-44 in Selected Asian Populations, 1970-2000 
30-34 40-44 
Population 
1970 2000 1970 2000 
Japan 7.2 26.6 5.3 8.6 
Myanmar 9.3 25.9 6.2 14.8 
Thailand 8.1 16.1 3.9 9.3 
Singapore Chinese 11.1 21.6 3.6 15.0 
Singapore Malays 3.9 12.2 1.7 8.2 
Malaysia Chinese 9.5 18.2 3.4 8.4 
Malaysia Malays 3.3 9.7 1.1 4.4 
Philippines 8.9 14.8 6.0 7.1 
South Korea 1.4 10.7 0.2 2.6 
Indonesia 2.2 6.9 1.2 2.4 
Source: G.W. Jones 2004, Appendix Table 1. 
 
Equally classic is that the postponement of parenthood follows in the wake of 
rising ages at marriage, particularly when out-of-wedlock fertility is low. How-
ever, shotgun marriages and births in the first 8 months of marriage may be-
come more frequent, as is already true for Japan (Tsuya 2006, Raymo et al. 
2008). More specifically, in 2004 27.5 percent of Japanese married women 
aged 25-29 had a premarital conception, and the figure was 25.8 percent for 
women aged 30-34, whereas older generations, now aged 55 and over, had 
figures in the vicinity of 4 to 7 percent (Tsuya 2006). Evidently, premarital 
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births are still rare in Far Eastern societies, but premarital conceptions and 
shotgun marriages are not. 
Exactly as in the Mediterranean countries, premarital cohabitation in Japan 
only emerged with a substantial time lag compared to the other hallmarks of 
the SDT. But initially it went unnoticed because no survey bothered to probe 
into the matter. In 2004, however, the first round of the Japanese “Gender and 
Generations Survey” revealed that a fifth of all women and men aged 25-29, 
irrespective of their current status, had ever experienced a spell of cohabitation. 
But also 10 year older ones, in the age group 40-44 in 2004, reported figures 
above 10 percent. Table 3 gives the results in greater detail. 
Table 3: Percentages of Japanese Men and Women of all Marital Statuses 
Reporting Ever Having Cohabited, GGS 2004 
Women Men Both sexes 
Age 
% (N) % (N) % (N) 
20-24 11.7 (322) 11.0 (243) 11.4 (565) 
25-29 20.2 (352) 20.6 (289) 20.4 (641) 
30-34 16.5 (345) 20.6 (296) 18.6 (641) 
35-39 15.7 (602) 15.9 (472) 15.8 (1.074) 
40-44 11.5 (456) 15.5 (400) 13.5 (856) 
45-49 7.5 (504) 10.7 (418) 9.1 (922) 
50-54 7.0 (558) 12.1 (523) 9.5 (1.081) 
55-59 5.4 (527) 8.3 (492) 6.9 (1.019) 
60-64 4.4 (535) 9.5 (498) 6.9 (1.033) 
65-69 2.1 (425) 5.0 (489) 3.7 (914) 
Total 10.0 (4,626) 12.6 (4,120) 14.6 (8,746) 
Source: N. Tsuya 2006, Table 1. 
 
The other Japanese survey, organized by the Mainichi Shimbun Newspaper in 
2004, essentially confirms the prevalence of premarital cohabitation, but more 
crucially, reveals that this is not a short duration ephemeral phenomenon. As 
Table 4 shows, the mean duration of the premarital cohabitation period is close 
to two years. 
The conclusion from the data presented so far is that Japan is no longer an 
exception to the package of SDT characteristics. Add to that the rise in pre-
marital conceptions and the hike in the divorce rate, and it becomes clear that 
Japan is by now definitely a SDT country, where the whole concept of partner-
ship and marriage are being redefined. The only missing ingredient so far is 
parenthood among cohabiting couples. 
Moreover, Japan is not just a single outlier in the Far East. Checking back 
into two KAP-surveys held in Taïwan, Li-Shou Yang found the following 
figures for percentages ever-cohabited (Table 5): 
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Table 4: Percentages of Japanese Women Cohabiting by Cohort, Mean 
Duration and Percentages Followed by Marriage, 
Mainichi Shimbun Group 2004 
 
Prevalence of cohabita-
tion experience (%) 
Mean duration of 
cohabiting unions 
(months) 
Percent of completed 
cohabiting unions 
resulting in marriage 
Total 15 21 58 
Birth cohort  
1954-59 10 22 64 
1960-64 10 21 70 
1965-69 17 26 62 
1970-74 21 20 61 
1975-79 21 21 40 
1980-84 10 16 44 
Source: Raymo, Iwasawa, and Bumpass 2008. 
Table 5: Percentages of Women 20-49 with Cohabitation Experience, 
Taïwan KAP Surveys of 1998 and 2004 
Current marital status KAP 1998 KAP 2004 
Unmarried 7.8 (N=731) 15.3 (1200) 
Married 12.6 (2262) 21.6 (2752) 
Total 11.4 (2993) 19.6 (3952) 
           Source: Li-Shou Yang, personal communication. 
 
Evidently, premarital cohabitation is not only present in Taïwan, but it is 
equally on the rise. If the figures for the KAP 2004 for married women could 
have been broken down by smaller age categories, then the incidence of pre-
marital cohabitation for married women 25-29 would almost certainly have 
been in excess of 25 percent, which is even higher than the corresponding 
Japanese figure.  
Finally, to our knowledge there is also evidence on cohabitation for the Phil-
ippines (Guerrero 1995; Jones 2005), but it is not yet clear whether this is a 
much older form of consensual union or actual pre-marital cohabitation. 
The empirical evidence on cohabitation for other industrialized or urban 
Asian societies is missing, again because it is just a priori taken for granted that 
its incidence is close to zero. As was the case for Mediterranean and former 
Communist Europe in the 1990s, this belief lasts until someone really sets out 
to insert the “ever cohabited” question in a survey. And it appears to us that 
such an insertion is overdue in the PR of China, South Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, at the very least.  
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5.3 Value Orientations and the Timing of Parenthood: 
Micro-Level Evidence for 3 Asian Populations 
Several Asian countries participated in one or two rounds of the “World Values 
Survey” which were shortened versions of their older European counterparts. 
These surveys are again a major source of information on the secularization 
dimension, civil and sexual morality, expressive values at work and in educat-
ing children, political features such as post-materialism, protest proneness and 
trust in institutions, and last but not least values regarding gender relations. 
Unfortunately, information on demographic characteristics is limited to the 
present number of children in the household and the current official marital 
status. No questions on currently or ever cohabited or on ever divorced were 
inserted. This means that these Asian versions can only be used to check 
whether later parenthood is indeed correlated with the same SDT-values indica-
tors as in the West: more egalitarian gender relations, accentuation of non-
material benefits in work, stress on autonomy and imagination in educating 
children, higher post-materialism scores on the Inglehart scales, greater protest 
proneness, greater distrust in institutions, less weight of religion, and a greater 
tolerance for breaches in civil and sexual morality. 
The data files of the “World Values Studies” also had to be pooled for Japan 
1995 and 2000, and for South Korea 1994 and 2001 to get to more than 600 
female respondents aged 18-45. For Singapore there was only one round. In all 
countries childlessness was predicted on the basis of age (5 categories), educa-
tion (3 categories: lower secondary, higher secondary, tertiary), occupational 
status (5 categories: professional, other white collar, blue collar, student, 
housewife) and 1 value item per regression. Use is made of binary logistic 
regression and the results for all value items are given in the 5 appendix tables 
in the form of exponentiated regression coefficients (expB or odds ratios) after 
controlling for the other covariates.8 Table 6, presented below, is made up of 
tallies of the number of such coefficients with net effects in the expected direc-
tion. For instance, in Japan, 15 of the 16 items related to gender issues had the 
expected net effect (conformist for earlier parenthood, non-conformist for later 
parenthood). 
Table 6 shows that not all items were present in the surveys of the three 
countries: Japan contributes 70 items, but South Korea only 56. The tallies of 
coefficients for all three countries show that more than 80 percent of them are 
in the expected direction. This furthermore means that there is an overwhelm-
ing concordance with what is found in the West (cf. Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 
2004): non-conformists or more libertarian attitudes correctly predict post-
                                                             
8  The detailed regression results can be consulted in the appendix of the University of Michi-
gan Population Studies Center Research Report 10-696 of January 2010: <www.psc.isr. 
umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr10-696.pdf>. 
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ponement of parenthood. The only exception encountered in these analyses 
pertains to the religion and secularization items in Japan. Here only 4 of the 10 
items behave as expected.  
Table 6: Link between Later Parenthood and sets of Value Orientations: 
Number of Items with Net Effects in the Expected Direction, Women aged 18-
45 (after controls for age, education, and occupational status). 
Japan South Korea Singapore 
 
1995, 2000 1994, 2001 2002 
a. Family and gender items 15 of 16 15 of 16 13 of 16 
b. Socialization traits 7 of 9 9 of 9 7 of 9 
c. Work characteristics 5 of 5 na 9 of 10 
d. Political orientations 19 of 20 17 of 19 7 of 9 
e. Ethics and morality issues 8 of 10 7 of 9 9 of 9 
d. Religion 4 of 10 2 of 3 9 of 10 
Total 58 of 70 50 of 56 54 of 63 
Total % 82,9 89,3 85,7 
Source: computed from World Values Studies Data Files, ISR Michigan. See Appendix in 
<www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr10-696.pdf>. 
 
The overall conclusion from this section is that there are indeed individual level 
data in three advanced Asian economies that show that the demographic di-
mension of parenthood postponement can be linked to the same value orienta-
tions as those associated with the SDT in Europe9. Further checks and stronger 
evidence still would be most welcome, and for a start, this requires the inser-
tion of a few simple questions concerning earlier cohabitation and divorce 
experience along with the current marital status question. This is a tiny altera-
tion of the World Values Surveys questionnaire which would generate very 
considerable returns for further empirical work pertaining to the Asian patterns 
of the SDT. 
6. Conclusions 
Before drawing more factual conclusions, we would like to make a major pre-
liminary point. We do so to avoid subsequent misunderstanding about the role 
                                                             
9  At this point one may want to speculate about the PR of China being a SDT-country or not. 
First and foremost, China is a large country, and certain subpopulations may move into the 
SDT well ahead of others. Hence the question cannot be answered for the Chinese popula-
tion as a whole. Second, the currently very low TFR is obviously the product of the “single 
child policy”. In order to detect the SDT-effect, that single child policy ought to be lifted. 
Only then can be seen where fertility would be bouncing back to or above replacement 
level and where not. Finally, in the latter areas, rises both in mean ages at marriage and in 
premarital cohabitation would equally be needed to make the case that certain Chinese sub-
populations have joined the SDT group. 
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of culture in the SDT. And this point is that the SDT-theory fully recognizes 
the effects of macro-level structural changes and of micro-level economic 
calculus. Only, it does not consider these explanations as “sufficient”, but 
merely as “necessary” or “non-redundant”. By the same token, also cultural 
explanations are non-redundant, but equally insufficient. Also, the SDT-theory 
does not consider cultural change as endogenous to any economic model, but 
as a necessary additional force with its own exogenous effects on demographic 
outcomes. Culture is not treated as some form of “addiction”, nor as a fixed 
script, but as a dynamic set of value orientations. As such these orientations can 
change at the individual level and they can be linked recursively to the unfold-
ing of the life course. And they can also change at the collective level during 
particular periods of time, or shift to new configurations with the succession of 
cohorts. In a general way, the motor of it all, i.e. Maslowian drift to higher 
order needs, is positively related to economic growth, but other factors reflect-
ing historical path dependency (often in religious and political spheres) modu-
late this connection. 
More than two decades after the first formulation of the SDT-theory, ad-
vanced industrial societies have virtually all witnessed the emergence of the 
SDT demographic characteristics as outlined in Table 1. The only exception so 
far is that cohabitation is not yet a setting for parenthood in Asian cases. But, 
several decades of experience in countries as distinct as Sweden and Japan 
have equally revealed that there are various SDT development paths. As was 
the case for the FDT as well, there are obviously numerous historical and cul-
tural reasons for pattern heterogeneity. 
Despite such differences in both tempo and quantum of demographic 
changes in family formation processes and in fertility, the core set of SDT 
predictions continues to hold:  
1) The normative and institutional props of traditional union formation and 
household structures will systematically weaken in all societies that move in 
the direction of egalitarian and democratic systems governed by the respect 
for individual choice. This implies that other forms of union formation will 
expand in the wake of such ideational developments. The political evolution 
of countries is then at least as crucial for the onset and unfolding of the SDT 
as their economic futures.  
2) Alongside individual autonomy, also self-realization will become a major 
goal in its own right. This will simultaneously produce a rising demand for 
higher education, especially among women, stimulate other tastes and life-
styles, and result in multiple types of living arrangements and in sustained 
sub-replacement fertility. 
3) Communication technology and mass media are spreading knowledge about 
all new forms of behavior to the remotest corners of the world. Moreover, 
new forms of behavior are associated by the public itself with being “more 
advanced” and “more developed” (Thornton 2005). Just like the FDT in 
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many developing countries benefited from this communication revolution, 
so will also the diffusion of the SDT be enhanced by global communication 
and by the power of “developmental idealism”.  
 
Fundamentalist reactions are likely to occur in response to these ideational 
trends, but so far their success in advanced industrial societies has been too 
limited to stem the overall shift toward “post-materialist” and expressive value 
orientations and concomitant SDT features. In these societies such reactions 
can slow down SDT trends or produce marked spatial differences, but they 
cannot stem the tide altogether. By contrast, in a number of developing coun-
tries we cannot exclude tendencies which constitute a fundamental refusal of 
modernity, which would not only lead to a halt of both FDT and subsequent 
SDT developments in these countries themselves, but to a much deeper idea-
tional and demographic duality on a global scale.  
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